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Scorning Senatorial Skullduggery in Sallust 
Brady B. Lonegran
Roman Banditry:
It is generally accepted that during both the Republican and Imperial eras 
(including the Pax Romana), banditry was commonplace throughout the 
known world.1 Due to its prevalence outside of urban centers, contemporary 
writers regarded brigandage as an unremarkable natural phenomenon only 
warranting a cursory glance.2 For this very reason, in his book Bandits in the 
Roman Empire: Myth and Reality (1999), Grünewald argues that an empirical 
study on banditry is simply impossible.3 However, as MacMullen notes in 
his appendix on ‘Brigandage,’ the Latin term latro (or the Greek: lestes) was 
applied to men apart from the traditional bandit. For example, it included 
individual usurpers or challengers of legitimate Imperial power rather than 
bands of marauders from the ‘barbaric’ border-states.4 Grünewald takes this 
observation further in his work on bandits and emphasizes latrones and lestai 
as historical categories, which can be used to classify social realities. For him, 
the latro is a literary topos, an “artifact of the literary imagination.”5  
‘Banditry,’ as viewed in Rome, was synonymous with the illegitimate 
exercise of personal power. As Shaw points out, in the stateless societies of 
Homeric Greece, banditry was an acceptable and even honorable occupation.6 
However, the formation of ‘the state’ as an “institutionalized form of power” 
left little room for extralegal displays of authority as they acted as decentralizing 
forces that threatened the supremacy of the state.7 With this development, all 
forms of latrocinium or lesteia acquired their contemporary connotations, and 
we come to the discussion of the sanction or the legitimization of power.
The fundamental question we must ask in a discussion of banditry and its 
relation to other expressions of power is ‘who sanctions whom?’  In historical 
accounts and literary depictions, we have three primary manifestations of 
the exercise of violence (vis). We have latrocinium symbolized by the latro, 
rebellion characterized by the rebel, and war (bellum) personified by an enemy 
(hostis) of the state. Although there are certain criteria and qualifications that 
separate these categories, the difference is often arbitrary and comes down 
to the attitude and agenda of the author. With the inherent vagueness of the 
terminology, we see Roman authors use these classifications interchangeably 
according to the direction of their narratives. In short, it is often the ulterior 
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motive of the author that dictates the characterization of ‘historical’ figures.
The subject of the author and his relation to the representation of historical 
figures as ‘bandits’ bring us to a few of the underlying questions motivating 
this paper: Is Jugurtha a bandit?  If not, who is he, and why does Sallust portray 
him in such a way?  Before getting into these questions, it seems imperative 
that we discuss and analyze ‘the bandit,’ as a real life phenomenon and more 
importantly, as a literary and historical metaphor, exploited by moralizing 
writers of Republican and Imperial Rome. It seems essential to note that 
Shaw and Hobsbawm among others are largely responsible for establishing 
the foundation upon which Grünewald successfully elaborates, and it is 
through these three authors, whom I attempt to establish a methodological 
framework from which I can approach the question of Jugurtha. In addition 
to establishing the boundaries among these three primary manifestations of 
power, our treatment of Jugurtha also necessitates a discussion of client-kings 
in relation to Rome. Once we have established the context, we can then turn 
our attention to Jugurtha as he is portrayed in Sallust’s The Jugurthine War.
Before trying to understand what constitutes a bandit, it can be helpful 
to figure out what a bandit is not. In Roman legal terms, “[e]nemies [hostes] 
are those who have declared war on us or on whom we have declared war; 
all the rest are bandits [latrones] or plunderers [praedones].”8 Implicit in the 
definition is that the aggressor or the opposing party must be a “sovereign” 
state acknowledged by Rome.9 Apart from a recognized political entity, 
enemies must be able to fight a regular war (bellum) with Rome. Irregular 
warfare would then be anything inconsistent with conventional Roman 
military strategy and focused primarily on guerrilla tactics. With such a 
selective definition, tribal warfare, village conflict, urban unrest and any 
acts of aggression not preceded by a formal declaration of war cannot be 
distinguished from banditry.10 As a rule, Roman legal classification of enemies 
is very exclusive, and “[t]he terminological indecisiveness of the sources 
raises the question as to whether the juridical distinction between hostes and 
latrones really had any practical relevance.”11    Since both banditry and war 
pose a threat to the state, sometimes the only distinction between the two is 
whether or not they pose a significant threat to Roman authority. Although 
nebulous, this criterion shows how, through an escalation of hostilities, a 
resistance movement can become a war. There are three factors that transform 
an individual and his men from latrones into hostes: the size of his forces, the 
success of his operations and the respect of the opposition.12 Beside the lack 
of a public declaration of hostility, it is impossible to differentiate between 
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brigandage and war.13 Thus, a foreign power could initiate a war against Rome 
and based on size, strategy and success, be considered a bandit-state incapable 
of legitimate warfare. With this in mind, the terms hostes and bellum become 
pretentious classifications meant to distinguish Rome from the rest of the 
world and hardly reflect the historical reality.
The term ‘rebel’ serves as a transition between latrones and hostes and implies 
that the aggressors are inhabitants of the Roman world. The most commonly 
recorded examples of rebels among Roman writers were the Isaurian and 
Cilician ‘bandits’ of the Taurus Mountains as well as the Celtiberians in Spain 
under Viriatus. Rebellions, generally caused by Roman expansion and the 
subsequent subjugation of native populations, often last until the success of 
Romanization.14 It is with rebels especially that we see a significant variance in 
the use of terminology. Part of this inconsistency arises from modern writers, 
who see Isaurian and Cilician banditry as an act of protest against the Roman 
order.15 Similarly, Shaw describes the increase in scale of the Cilician resistance 
as demonstrative of a shift from banditry to rebellion.16    Hopwood also notes 
that ‘bandits’ frequently functioned as the nucleus of any full-scale peasant 
rebellion. 17 Furthermore, he argues that shepherds, whose transhumant style 
of living left them marginalized, were often assumed to be associated with 
bandits and may have played a similar role in regional resistance.18  
This association of shepherds and bandits with resistance movements 
is not an exceptional case. Rebels are often associated with or even called 
bandits, and there is considerable overlap between the attributes of both. As 
we will see, the two types are generally of ‘barbarian’ origin, resort to guerrilla 
warfare, exploit a superior knowledge of the terrain and have complex 
motivations. The nebulous nature of these definitions, which is largely the 
result of authorial motives, can be elaborated upon more easily once we have 
established the criteria and qualifications for our bandit.
In Organised Crime in Late Antiquity, Hopwood argues that bandits are 
not just the literary topoi described by Shaw. Instead, he asserts,
“Bandits were more than an abstract category: their lives on the ground 
were brutal and short; they were men, however, with temporary aims, 
rather than long-term principled causes. In times of stability they were 
something that the political cadre could be drawn together to oppose; 
in times of transformation they were conspicuous symbols of that 
transformation.”19  
Although Hopwood seems to posit this idea against Shaw’s primary aim, 
which is to demonstrate that what we have from ancient sources is merely 
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Jugurtha in chains before Sulla, illustration from La conjuracion 
de Catilina y la Guerra de Jugurta (Madrid, 1772) 
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a figurative representation of an ideal, the two ideas do not seem wholly 
incompatible. Shaw would agree with Hopwood that bandits did exist as 
more than an abstraction; but he would point out that these concrete bandits 
were so unremarkable that they did not warrant the attention of ancient 
sources, and that our sources only refer to bandits in terms of forces opposing 
Rome or in the context of political discord. Shaw even provides an additional 
explanation for why our sources are so lacking by describing his concept of 
‘space.’  Claiming that bandits existed on the periphery of mainstream society, 
he allows for need and greed as the primary motivations for banditry and 
argues that bandit communities “tended to be characterized by an absence of 
all ‘higher’ civil modes of communication in writing or graphic symbols.”20 In 
short, ‘real’ bandits left no written record, so we can only speculate on their 
reality and have to accept our ‘historical’ and literary examples for what they 
are: metaphors. At the very least both Hopwood and Shaw would plausibly 
agree with Grünewald in saying that banditry was perpetrated by bands of 
disreputable folk out to make a buck at the tip of a sword.21  
The term latro originally meant mercenary but came to describe “any sort of 
extra-legal man of violence.”22 Roman legal definition distinguishes banditry 
from common theft by the former’s use of violence (vis), by its reliance 
upon a band (factio) and by its premeditated intention. The first criterion 
is consistent with the notion of an “economy of violence”, which consists 
of materials procured by way of violence or the threat of violence.23 Bandits 
were also distinct from other non-violent criminals. “They were interstitial 
characters, seen neither as persons with rights in civil law nor as enemies of the 
state but somewhere in between.”24 Somewhere between common criminals 
and hostes, bandits were prosecuted harshly and left without the right to 
an appeal. They were either burnt alive, crucified, impaled or thrown into 
the arena. Moreover, brigands were often killed immediately upon arrest.25 
Interestingly enough, these same punishments were reserved for insurgents as 
well, further blurring the lines between the two categories.
By this point, we can tentatively define banditry as a premeditated act of 
opportunistic violence committed by groups of individuals. This classification 
leaves room for both the ‘real’ bandit and his literary representation, on which 
we should now focus our attention. However, before departing from reality, we 
can look at Shaw’s description of latrocinium, which applies to both types of 
banditry and provides an easy transition into the remainder of our discussion: 
“Banditry is a form of personal power… This individual power, based on 
charisma, on appearance, on brute strength, and on the ties forged by way 
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of personhood (kinship, friendship, or clientage), is probably one of the 
primal forms of power known to humans.”26  
This quote evokes images of typical Homeric heroes and is consistent with the 
depiction of banditry in the texts of Roman antiquity. As we will soon see, 
this exercise of personal power inherently poses a challenge to the sovereign 
state by creating a separate autonomous entity.
     Although inconsistent with reality, Hobsbawm’s notion of the ‘social 
bandit’ fits perfectly with the romanticized depictions of ancient authors and 
feed into the framework provided by Grünewald. Hobsbawm takes a Marxist 
interpretation, apparent in his discussion of the social origins of bandits:
“For the crucial fact about the bandit’s social situation is its ambiguity. He 
is an outsider and a rebel, a poor man who refuses to accept the normal 
roles of poverty, and establishes his freedom by means of the only resources 
within reach of the poor, strength, bravery, cunning and determination.”27 
With this explanation, he stresses the bandit’s close connection to the poor. 
For our purposes, Hobsbawm is spot on in terms of the autonomy of the 
brigand, but as we will see later, bandits were drawn from all backgrounds. 
However, his definition remains consistent with a Marxist reading of the 
subject. Additionally, the ‘social bandit’ is motivated by a desire to counteract 
and avenge injustice and to regulate the interaction between the wealthy and 
the destitute so as to prevent the exploitation of the weak.28 He argues that 
bandits are “reformers, not revolutionaries”, but that they can act as the first 
phase in a progression towards revolution when their acts become associated 
with defiance against oppressive forces or when they themselves have been 
overcome by hope for a better future.29 In short, one can see how bandits 
could transition easily between robbery and revolution, as they become armed 
and mobilized.
     To illustrate his points, Hobsbawm outlined nine basic criteria for his 
‘social bandit,’ whom we will find as the prototype for Grünewald’s ‘noble’ 
bandit. “First, the noble robber begins his career of outlawry not by crime, 
but as the victim of injustice.”30 Second, the social bandit is motivated to 
oppose inequality. Third, he is to provide for a redistribution of wealth by 
way of stealing from the wealthy for the betterment of the impoverished. 
Fourth, he never kills without justification. “Fifth, if he survives, he returns 
to his people as an honourable citizen and member of the community.”31 
Sixth, he enjoys the support of his community and often maintains a role as 
a local leader. Seventh, the ‘social bandit’ is invincible except in the case of 
betrayal. Eighth, he cannot be seen or beaten. Ninth, he only challenges the 
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authority of the local tyrant, while the king or emperor is the embodiment of 
justice.32    The mythical account of Robin Hood is the basis for Hobsbawm’s 
‘social bandit’ and is surprisingly consistent with the ‘noble’ bandits we have 
in Roman sources. The main difference, however, lies in the fact that unlike 
Hobsbawm’s ‘social bandit,’ the ‘noble’ bandit is often meant to criticize 
the Emperor and local officials. Otherwise, we will see that Hobsbawm’s 
qualifications act as motifs throughout our sources and that Grünewald 
expands upon the conception of the ‘social bandit.’  Although Hobsbawm’s 
theory is highly romanticized, he does admit the certainty that “[i]n real life 
most Robin Hoods were far from noble.”33  
Using the ‘historical’ accounts available, Grünewald has created two types 
of bandits (‘common’ vs. ‘noble’) and four classifications based on their actions 
(‘bandits,’ ‘rebels,’ ‘rivals’ and ‘avengers’). In his investigation of banditry, he 
considers the cases of Viratus, Tacfarinas, Catiline, Bulla Felix and Maternus 
among others. Although each individual primarily fits into one category or 
another, he admits that there is significant overlap and that his definitions 
,by no means final, should be used only as a valuable tool.34    In this case, 
the ‘common’ bandit is the malevolent manifestation of this classification, 
bent on terror and destruction. In contrast, the ‘noble’ bandit is more akin to 
Hobsbawm’s ‘social bandit.’  As we have already seen, the distinction between 
bandits and rebels is quite arbitrary. Later, it will make more sense when we 
see how and why our ancient authors used one term versus the other. To point 
out this lack of clarity, Grünewald shows through Viriatus and Tacfarinas 
how terms are used interchangeably. The classification of rivals applies to 
political or ideological rivals like Catiline, faction leaders of the Late Republic 
and the Third Century Crisis, and those who are portrayed more directly 
as rivals to Imperial power, like Bulla Felix and Maternus. The avenger is 
probably the most flexible category, as most historical bandits are cited as 
motivated by a desire for vengeance. Revenge is a significant aspect of the 
literary topoi surrounding the bandit, and as motivation, it is consistent with 
Hobsbawm’s conception of the ‘social bandit’.35 Banditry in its ‘noble’ form 
was also typified by its leader’s charismatic “magnetism,”36 which contributes 
to a bandit’s following as well as to the success of his operations. As with the 
‘social bandit,’ the ‘noble’ bandit, otherwise invulnerable, is susceptible only 
to deceit.37 Grünewald cites both Maternus and Bulla Felix as examples of 
men whose exploits end only when close associates betray them. However, 
the ‘noble’ bandit is victorious even in defeat. To demonstrate the fact that he 
cannot be brought down by conventional means, he always gets the last laugh. 
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For example, when the Praetorian Prefect Papinian asks Bulla why he entered 
a life of brigandage, he replies, “Why did you become a prefect?”38    The 
use of quick-witted quips in the face of defeat is an inheritance from Tacitus 
and possibly even earlier sources and demonstrates the inadequacy of current 
leadership, as we will see later in this discussion.39  
The barbarian origin of the bandit is another important feature for our 
developing definition. Rural districts, populated by ‘uncivilized’ rustics living 
on the margins of society, are the typical breeding grounds for barbarian 
bandits in Roman sources. What is considered even more ‘barbaric’ is the 
nomadic mode of life practiced by shepherds, depicted as so unsettled and 
uncivilized that they are not even agrarian.40   As shepherds are viewed as more 
barbaric than agrarians, we see another reason for their close association with 
banditry. Similarly, Shaw refers to the “hereditary” nature of brigandage in 
Cilicia, Isauria and Spain, and we see in Apuleius’ Metamorphoses the criminal 
pedigree boasted of by Haemus the Thracian.41 The hereditary and barbaric 
nature of banditry reinforces the motif of the bandit as a ‘noble savage.’  The 
Celtiberian leader Viriatus personifies this ideal version of the truth, which 
is prevalent throughout historical accounts. The barbarism of these historical 
figures is also stressed because brigandage was considered the most primitive 
manifestation of power in pre-state societies ruled only by social contract. In 
short, the remoteness of any geographical location was indicative of its level 
of barbarism and banditry. 
Although banditry requires a state to dictate which expressions of 
power are and are not legitimate, it also requires a state insofar as it exists 
on the periphery, straddling its political boundaries. Shaw describes this 
area as a “no-man’s-land”, outside the jurisdiction of Imperial governors.42 
Similarly, the extent of Roman control in any district is dependent upon the 
geography of that region. Mountains, forests, swamps and essentially any 
“topography sufficiently forbidding to prevent the effective penetration of 
urban institutions” also usually demarcated the limits of Roman authority.43 
The natural resistance to urban encroachment offered by these isolated and 
oftentimes impregnable locales was thought to be indicative of the prevalence 
of bandits and was believed to be a source of their strength. The bandits in our 
historical accounts are often shown to have an advantage in their familiarity 
with and affinity for the harsh terrain. As we will see later, superior knowledge 
of local topography and the use of lighter long-range weapons conducive to 
guerrilla warfare were commonly associated with bandits.
The band (factio), although generally understood to be small, is an essential 
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Frontispiece of The Works of Apuleius, Bohn’s Library edition, 1902. 
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aspect of banditry as being distinct from common robbery.44 Bandits rely on 
the social contract they share with their brothers in arms as well as on the local 
support of their families and the greater community.45 Even if they do not 
enjoy the support of the community as a whole, bandits depend heavily upon 
some sort of third party member, who acts as a mainstream contact. These 
receptatores, responsible for the conversion of stolen objects into money, 
act also as informants and are considered just as bad, if not worse than the 
bandits with whom they work.46 The most successful and enduring bandits 
relied on their allegiance to wealthy landowners (honestiores/domini). By this 
association, bandits could legitimize their acts of violence.47 Shaw reports that 
in Apuleius’ Metamorphoses we see the poor as most often drawn to banditry 
for the social mobility it offers (inclusion and a sense of recognition as part of 
a ‘gang,’ acquisition of material wealth and a sense of empowerment through 
the exercise of violence). Arguably the most important aspect of ‘the band’ as 
a metaphor and as a draw for prospective brigands is the bandits’ egalitarian 
system of justice. The most important feature of this ideal is the equal division 
of booty, from which Marxist interpretations arise. Also significant is the idea 
that the bandits maintain a fair system of material distribution without laws 
and, as social contract serves as the only safeguard against administrative 
abuse.48 As we will find, this social cohesion, often absent in Roman society, 
is an escapist ideal for many writers. 
As we discussed before, bandits were marked by their affinity for irregular 
warfare. Regardless, the Romans pretentiously referred to any opponent as 
a bandit if he could not “field a regular army of heavy infantry, trained in 
and equipped with the weapons of Greco-Roman military science.”49 For this 
reason, despite the respect bestowed upon Viriatus as a military commander, 
he was still generally portrayed as a rebel bandit rather than as a legitimate 
enemy. Despite their derision of partisan warfare, the Romans resorted to 
guerrilla tactics on several occasions (for instance, the final phase of the 
Second Punic War). In truth, as a form of indigenous resistance, where 
native insurgents have limited resources and a superior knowledge of the 
terrain, it is simply the most strategically viable option. Along with partisan 
tactics, bandits also used the cloak of darkness “to exploit the common fear, 
deliberately disguising themselves as ghosts in order to add to the terror of 
their sudden nightly incursions.”50 Similarly, there is a common cultural 
association of bandits with ghosts, darkness and death. This connection is 
reasonable as the obscurity of night enhances the aura of apparent invisibility 
as well as the general effectiveness of guerrilla attacks.
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In The City of God, St. Augustine poses two important questions: “Remove 
justice and what are states but gangs of bandits on a large scale? And what 
are bandit gangs but kingdoms in miniature?”51    For our discussion, there is 
only one difference separating states and bands of brigands: the legitimization 
of violence. As Shaw points out, both live “parasitically” by stealing from 
others.52 Like empires, gangs of bandits were known to employ both large-
scale and more modest operations; some bands would even exact payment 
from neighbors in exchange for “protection.”53 Hopwood notes that taxation 
and its enforcement in the provinces by kolletiones were no different from the 
‘tribute’ of bandits. Either violence or the threat of violence was almost always 
used in order to exact revenue from Roman subjects. Additionally, Hopwood, 
attempting to explain why Rome’s policy of extortion was considered taxation 
rather than banditry or opportunistic violence, comes up with the notion 
of a “monopoly of violence” held by the state.54 As discussed previously, 
the development of the state and the formation of institutionalized power 
transformed these expressions from a Homeric ideal into an immoral act. 
Hopwood continues by explaining that if the state is to maintain its ‘monopoly 
of violence,’ then, as a mediator of internal conflict, it must actively choose a 
side, protecting one and condemning the other.55 In doing so, the state creates 
a definition of what is lawful, and because independent expressions of power 
inherently undermine government authority, they become acts of banditry 
unjustifiable under law.
As we have seen before, the most enduring bandits were those who could 
depend upon the influence of wealthy patrons. Hopwood points out two roads 
available to the extra legal man of violence: either he could remain free and run 
the risk of capture, torture and execution, or he could exchange his individual 
autonomy and martial skill for the protection of local elite.56 These armed 
retainers often functioned in two capacities by which their violence became 
legitimate. As their patrons were generally local town-councilors or eirenarchs 
(peace officers), typically drawn from the elite, they could be deputized as a 
pseudo police force, serving as a bodyguard for the wealthy individual and 
his estate. This outsourcing or insourcing, as the case may be, was even taken 
up by provincial governors, who lacked the military resources to patrol their 
own territories. Members of these quasi-peacekeeping forces,known as the 
diogmitai, were generally drawn from those armed retainers already serving 
the local elite. Under Roman law, these diogmitai were quite literally given 
a ‘license to kill’ and were not held responsible for their actions.57 Moreover, 
these so-called peacekeepers often “behaved as badly as the villains they were 
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supposed to be chasing.”58 That Rome resorted to using bandits to fight other 
bandits illustrates the point that the only distinction between brigandage and 
‘moral’ acts of violence was the sanction of the state. 
     In Roman conception, the bandit’s relation to both shepherds and soldiers is 
very important, as it helps demonstrate the legitimacy of power under Roman 
rule. Shaw explains that the shepherd and soldier always existed as “potential” 
brigands.59    The first problematic class of soldier is the veteran. After active 
service, the professional Roman soldier is prepared for neither the transition 
into agrarian life nor reentrance into mainstream society. With their skill set, 
it was much easier to turn to banditry as a means of subsistence. The defeated 
armies of the Late Republic’s civil wars were often forced to demobilize, 
so many of these men resorted to brigandage out of economic necessity.60 
During periods of political instability, robber barons took advantage of this 
pool of unemployed professional soldiers to increase their wealth and power.61 
In this way, men who typically would have been considered bandits were able 
to fill the vacuum and acquire legitimate authority.62 For example, during 
the Third Century Crisis, Maximinus the Thracian, a shepherd bandit who 
became a Roman soldier, won renown and eventually the Imperial throne for 
his daring military feats and positive yet decidedly ‘barbarian’ attributes. Most 
importantly, Maximinus was not the exception; the barbarian bandit emperor 
became a theme of the Late Empire in the West.63  
Similar trends occur in the Roman military in general as it becomes more 
barbarized. Cassius Dio shows that soldiers were often drawn from the same 
pool as bandits and that there was little visible difference between soldiers 
and bandits. Cassius Dio claims that this practice originated in the Roman 
tendency to recruit barbarians in order to maintain an auxiliary force while 
preventing these same men from becoming bandits in their own territories.64 
As we have already seen, many Roman soldiers had lived as shepherds prior 
to enlistment, for they transitioned easily into both soldiery and brigandage 
because they have a skill set comparable to that of solders. Additionally, 
because of the “de facto freedom” inherent in their mobility, armament and 
distance from administrative centers, shepherds were considered natural 
predators.65  
Towards the end of the Republic, Cicero coined the term latro as a political 
epithet.66 Unlike other types of bandit, in its political context, the term latro 
was never positive. However, it still implied that same lack of legitimacy and 
was used more figuratively as a means of comparison between the policies of 
a particular politician and the general outlawry of brigands. Because it was 
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typically used to challenge the legitimacy of an opponent, the term eventually 
came to be synonymous with usurper.67 In coining this usage of latro, Cicero 
drew upon the similarities between political parties and gangs of bandits.68 
As a political epithet, it was used during the civil war between Caesar and 
Pompey as well as throughout the Imperial era. During the Crisis of the Third 
Century, it was used primarily as a way to “stigmatize” political opponents as 
dangerous and illegitimate claimants to the throne.69 According to the literary 
and historical topoi, once on the throne, these bandit emperors maintained 
their personal qualities. They were set apart by their humble origins, rough 
demeanor, brute strength, affinity for alcohol and sexual appetite.70    Despite 
possible positive associations, the use of the term against legitimate emperors 
was generally a result of “the deep conflict between the senatorial aristocracy 
and the so-called soldier-emperors.”71  
The brigand as a political label was also used for local dynasts that had 
fallen in favor at Rome. During the civil wars of the Late Republican era, 
these same warlords were especially prone to being denigrated as latrones if 
they were on the losing side of the war effort.72 Although clients of victorious 
Romans were often safe from this mockery, any marginal, independent prince 
could be regarded as a bandit because it was believed that he “used [his] 
personal arm[y] to fight private wars which, from a legal point of view, were 
no more than plundering expeditions.”73 In short, any semi-independent state 
outside of direct Roman administration was subject to the label of bandit. 
The bandit is a metaphorical figure in Roman history and is used as a 
comparison rather than a representation of reality. As a rule, any mention 
of bandits by a Roman writer signals the existence of an ulterior motive.74 
Generally, literary and historical banditry provides a “social mirror” and 
microcosm of the current social order, which often inverts traditional 
relationships and carries with it a criticism of the inequities of the current 
world order.75 Typically, the egalitarian values of the literary bandit acted as an 
ideal and offered a “picture of a better world”76   where justice prevailed and 
where men could rely on one another through bonds of “philia (friendship) 
and syngeneia (cooperation)” as the only means of social contract.77 
Grünewald’s commentary on the selflessness of Cilician pirates amongst 
themselves summarizes the effect of the bandit as a literary fabrication: “even 
if this report is fantasy, at least it offers an insight into the unfulfilled wishes 
and longings of a society in which social constructs such as the patron-client 
system were no longer able to provide a basic level of cohesion.”78 Moreover, the 
inclusion of bandits in historical accounts provides “a consistent commentary 
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on the nature of power and on the contrast between the opposites of justice 
and legitimacy in the exercise of power.”79  As both a political epithet and a 
narrative device, the bandit is at the forefront of the Roman dialogue on the 
legitimacy of power.
     In order to understand the duality of the good and the bad representations 
of bandits, it is helpful to examine some examples. In the historical accounts 
of Roman authors, Viriatus is a projection of the ideal citizen of Rome.80 He 
acts as a reincarnation of Cincinnatus (or Romulus and Remus among others) 
and the primitive yet noble origins of Rome. Here, his barbarian heritage is 
a positive as it is used to provide a sharp contrast with the greed, corruption 
and brutality of the Roman commanders sent against him. Not only does 
he form a critique of those military men, but he is also a condemnation of 
the decadence of the senatorial aristocracy. Additionally, Viriatus stands apart 
because of his righteous cause. Here, his motivations are meant to contrast with 
the egotistical impulse behind Roman foreign policy. Not only did Viriatus 
resist the unjust incursions of Rome and nobly defend his people, but he also 
avenged the brutal massacre of his comrades at the hands of Servius Sulpicius 
Galba. Roman writers even justify Viriatus’ youthful banditry because it 
served as preparation, “strengthened his manly virtues and increased his 
capacity for great deeds.”81 It is also important to note that whenever Viriatus 
is referred to as a bandit it is only to highlight his superior skills as a shrewd 
and charismatic military leader. He is transformed into a bandit to show how 
barbarian virtus can overcome the Roman military machine.82  
Numidian rebel Tacfarinas, though forced to resort to guerrilla warfare 
like Viriatus, he was depicted negatively. First off, Tacfarinas’ career embodies 
a devolution in character. Whereas Viriatus begins as a shepherd bandit and 
through his manly virtues becomes a tribal leader and successful military 
commander, Tacfarinas is seen as suspect in his motivations and as embarking 
upon a moral decline after his desertion from the auxiliary forces. Grünewald 
argues that Tacfarinas was considered a also bandit because he never 
represented a serious threat to Roman authority in North Africa.83 More 
importantly, Tacitus portrays him as a trivial threat in order to demonstrate 
Tiberius’ incompetence and inadequacy as Emperor.84 Regardless, his negative 
portrayal is also symptomatic of Roman attitudes towards desertion, viewed 
as betrayal and even as rebellion. 
     In the case of Bulla Felix and Maternus, the former represents the 
‘noble’ bandit while the latter his ‘common’ counterpart, distinguished by 
his motivations. On the one hand, Felix is motivated by a pursuit of justice 
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and acts as a wake up call for the Emperor; Maternus’ actions, on the other 
hand, are dictated by baser instincts, which inspire his designs on the 
Imperial throne.85 In representing Maternus as a usurper brought down by 
fellow bandits who prefer the authority of the rightful emperor to that of a 
usurper, Herodian questions the legitimacy of the emperors of the Severan 
Dynasty.86 Like Tacfarinas, the character of Bulla Felix was used to cast doubt 
on the competence of Septimius Severus because he had such a difficult time 
subduing a mere bandit. There are also a number of other theories surrounding 
Bulla Felix as a literary fabrication. Grünewald argues that his name and 
character were meant to channel imperial authority. As examples, he cites 
the connection between Bulla and the Imperial amulet of the same name as 
well as the moniker Felix, which was assumed by several emperors, Sulla in 
particular. Additionally, Grünewald points to the link between Bulla’s band of 
followers and the Senate, both of which are composed of exactly six hundred 
men.87 In contrast to Septimius’ burdensome taxes, Bulla is depicted as only 
stealing a part of his victims’ belongings. Most importantly, Bulla is shown 
masquerading in the uniforms of Roman centurions and magistrates. This 
depiction illustrates Cassius Dio’s primary criticism, which is the “loosening 
of the traditional social hierarchy” leading inevitably to the lowest classes’ 
rising to the highest positions.88 In this way, Cassius Dio expresses his outrage 
at the “superficiality and artificiality of state power and social constraints.”89 
In short, Bulla’s character is meant to shift his audience’s focus to the problems 
for which its members should be held accountable.90  
Having completed our overview of banditry, we can now shift our focus to 
the topic of client-kings, which are relevant to our analysis of Jugurtha. Like 
bandits, client-kingdoms existed on the peripheries, both in and outside of 
the Roman Empire.91 Hobsbawm explains this phenomenon perfectly when 
he writes, “Where the state is remote, ineffective and weak, it will indeed be 
tempted to come to terms with any local power-group it cannot defeat.”92 
Although Hobsbawm refers to ‘bandits’ in particular, his statement can be 
directly applied to the case of Roman client-kingship because as Braund argues, 
the relation of the client-king to Rome is not always one of subservience, in 
which case, Rome often acted out of convenience in order to avoid costly 
military confrontations.93 Braund makes this point also because client-kings 
were not always the mindless lackeys abhorred by Tacitus and should be referred 
to as ‘friendly’ kings instead. Realistically, both sides, not just the Empire, 
had to find their relationship gratifying. Linda Honey claims that the whole 
conflict in Isauria arose when the Isaurians, who were originally ‘friends’ of the 
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Roman Empire, felt slighted after Rome had broken their ‘covenant’ (which is 
meant to be reciprocal and has serious implications in Near Eastern culture) 
with the imposition of taxes.94 In return for contributing soldiers, provisions 
and money (rarely as a form of institutionalized taxation), the friendly king 
“had a moral claim to Rome’s protection.”95 Most client-kings had adequate 
resources at their disposal to defend their territory, and the knowledge that 
assailing an allied power could very well provoke Roman retaliation was 
generally sufficient deterrence. This association also served to enhance Rome’s 
status as a military power and discouraged future transgressions.96  
The most important reward for a client-king’s allegiance was the power 
and authority. Braund stresses that men with no legitimate or hereditary 
right to the throne owed their position entirely to the endorsement of 
Rome. These men could also rely upon Roman protection if ousted from 
power.97 Rome enhanced its reputation by displaying its power to give away 
(or simply recognize) entire kingdoms. In return, the friendly king handled 
administrative affairs and performed essential functions in an environment 
less receptive to Roman governors.98 This delegation of administrative affairs 
and inherent autonomy is demonstrative of much of Rome’s policy towards 
local authorities. Braund’s main point seems to be that Rome exploited this 
means of delegation because she “gained a great deal from her friendly kings 
in return for a relatively meager investment.”99
At one point or another in his Jugurthine War, Sallust ascribes the qualities 
characteristic of each of our categories to Jugurtha. First off, since he was 
recognized as King of Numidia, it is important to analyze the nature of 
that kingship. Although “he was born to a concubine”100 and was “inferior 
to [Adherbal and Hiempsal] on his mother’s side,”101 the current Numidian 
king, Micipsa, “adopted him and established him as heir along with his sons 
in his will.”102 Here, because of his ignoble birth, Jugurtha’s legitimacy as heir 
to the Numidian throne is thrown into question. After the death of Micipsa, 
Jugurtha begins to consolidate his power. Instead of sharing administrative 
duties, he decides to dispose of his adoptive brothers “by whatever means.”103 
After the murder of Hiempsal, “[t]he Numidians [were] divided into two 
parties,” one led by the remaining brother and the other by Jugurtha.104 This 
splintering of the state is reminiscent of the civil wars of the Late Republic and 
those of succession of the Empire. It is also important to note that the same 
phenomenon also occurred in other client-kingdoms, where Rome often 
acted according to expediency and did not care which side won as long as it 
remained loyal to Rome. One can then see why the Republican authorities 
Penn History Review     87 
Roman Banditry
overlooked Jugurtha’s murder of Adherbal and Hiempsal. However, Rome’s 
hand was forced after the massacre at Cirta: “when the choice arose between 
loyalty to a client-king and loyalty to the Italian traders, Jugurtha could not 
hope to win.”105 So, in spite of his connections, Jugurtha overstepped his 
bounds and provoked a formal military response. 
As we have seen in the previous section on client-kingship, Jugurtha shows 
a considerable level of autonomy and does not embody his title’ subservient 
connotation. By sending gifts and exploiting his connection to Scipios, 
“Jugurtha acquired access to the favour and goodwill of the nobility”, and like 
any politically adept client-king, he “canvassed individual members of the 
senate” for his consolidation of power.106 He also interacts with a neighboring 
kingdom through his recruitment of Bocchus of Mauretania as an ally. 
Jugurtha even binds himself to Bocchus through ties of marriage, which hold 
little value as a result of Numidian and Mauretanian polygamy.107
Despite the dubious nature of Jugurtha’s deceitful tactics, Sallust repeatedly 
reminds us of the Numidian’s popularity in Rome and North Africa. As we 
have seen, P. Scipio “counted him amongst his friends…”, which helped 
preserve his high regard in the Senate.108 Most notably however, Sallust 
depicts Jugurtha as popular amongst his fellow Numidians and African 
neighbors. He is referred to as “dear to them all”109 and as “a man so well liked 
by his compatriots” periodically throughout the text in order to demonstrate 
“the Numidians’ burning enthusiasm for Jugurtha.”110    Even Bocchus in his 
double-dealings has to consider the fact that by betraying his neighbor, “he 
might alienate the hearts of his compatriots, for whom Jugurtha was dear and 
the Romans resented.”111 In my mind, the degree of popularity and support 
Jugurtha enjoys amongst his people as ruler of Numidia helps legitimize his 
claim to the throne; more importantly however, it demonstrates one of the 
first and foremost characteristics of our literary bandit.
     Along with fulfilling the criterion of maintaining the support of his 
community, Jugurtha is initially represented as the embodiment of early 
Roman virtues. “He was powerfully strong, of becoming appearance but, 
above all, forceful in intellect.”112    Additionally, he was “[a] man of action 
above all”113 who “had an appetite for glory” and “[b]y working very hard and 
taking great pains, as well as by the most deferential obedience and frequent 
encounters with danger, he had soon reached such a degree of distinction that 
he was overwhelmingly dear to our men…”114 As a Numidian of barbarian 
ancestry, Jugurtha qualifies another criterion for our literary bandit. In 
short, Sallust characterizes Jugurtha as a ‘noble’ barbarian and ideal Roman 
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(i.e. “Numidians for the most part fed on milk and wild-animal flesh”), 
reminiscent of Rome’s founders.115
Along with the previously discussed attributes, Jugurtha is most identifiable 
as a bandit because of his military tactics and charismatic leadership. Before 
every engagement, “by using guarantees, threats and entreaties as was 
appropriate to the temperament of each man, he motivated them all in 
different ways.”116    In short, through encouraging words and his presence in 
battle, Jugurtha “magnified both the courage of his own men and the terror of 
the enemy.”117    Additionally, his tactics stand out as being decidedly guerrilla. 
Jugurtha is often shown attacking “unexpectedly”118   “at dead of night”119 
and seizing “many mortals along with cattle and other plunder.”120    He 
regularly uses his elite ‘band’ of Numidian cavalry to ambush enemy forces, 
and he often takes advantage of his superior knowledge of the terrain and of 
the cover provided by local vegetation to conceal his movements.121    Many 
of the confrontations reported by Sallust are noted for their “irregularity”122 
and are even said “to resemble banditry rather than a battle.”123 In addition to 
nocturnal raids, Jugurtha also resorts to “contaminating the fodder and water 
sources” in his war of attrition against Roman forces under Metellus.124 Finally, 
like our other ‘noble’ bandits, Jugurtha cannot be defeated by conventional 
means. Instead, he is betrayed by his Mauretanian ally and ambushed by the 
Romans en route to an alleged peace conference.125
Although he exhibits many of the qualities characteristic of our literary 
latro, Jugurtha also demonstrates that he is a legitimate threat and enemy of 
the Roman state. First off, Sallust describes the conflict as a “war…which the 
Roman people waged with Jugurtha, king of the Numidians [and which] was 
great and fierce and of only sporadic success.”126 Implicit in this statement is 
the recognition of Jugurtha as a legitimate political entity. It also illustrates 
why the conflict could be seen as both a war and as a series of isolated acts 
of banditry or rebellion because although it was significant to some degree, 
it was of limited success and eventually ended in Jugurtha’s defeat. However, 
there is a significant body of evidence pointing to the interpretation that the 
conflict between Rome and Jugurtha was that between two warring powers. 
Although we have seen that Jugurtha regularly used guerrilla tactics in his 
military operations, he is also depicted as a very able commander and is shown 
only abandoning conventional warfare after his confrontation with Metellus 
(who along with Marius stoops to both deceit and total warfare as well as 
slash and burn techniques against civilian targets).127Against the previous 
commander, Jugurtha mobilizes and commands large armies organized into 
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infantry, cavalry and elephants,128 practices a decidedly Roman brand of siege 
warfare129 and even sends a defeated Roman army under the yoke in the typical 
fashion.130 Most importantly however, the Senate issues a formal declaration 
of war against Jugurtha and dispatches Metellus to direct military operations 
in Africa. And, although Sallust never mentions it, upon his return to Rome, 
Marius was granted a Triumph in which Jugurtha was paraded throughout 
the city in chains prior to his execution.
After looking at the various aspects of the conflict between Jugurtha and 
Rome, it is necessary to look at Sallust’s motivations for his representation 
of the Numidian. As with Bulla Felix and Viriatus, the bandit is rarely the 
actual focus of any historical account. Sallust is no exception in that his 
didactic intentions dominate his interpretation of events and use Jugurtha as 
a means of illustrating a point.131 “Like his Greek predecessors… who shaped 
their narratives to illustrate a view of human nature, Sallust molded his own 
narrative… to expose corruption in Rome and to put the war with Jugurtha 
into a larger historical and moral context.”132 As Dué claims, Sallust’s goal 
was to highlight the moral corruption in Rome. Sallust believed that in the 
decades of relative stability following Hannibal’s defeat, Rome had lost its 
edge, becoming a den of corruption characterized by bribery and deceit.133 
Sallust also distorts the timeline of events to realize his own intent. Although 
the war of succession and Jugurtha’s return from Numantia were more than 
fifteen years apart, Sallust compresses the chronology in order to demonstrate 
the infectiousness of Roman decadence. As a result, the narrative reads as if 
Jugurtha’s moral decline and subsequent ambition for power were precipitated 
by his interaction with the Roman nobility in Scipio’s entourage.134 This 
argument is also concurrent with Sallust’s thesis that the ruination brought 
about by the devolution of virtue into base ambition was caused by contact 
with the inherently depraved Roman senatorial class.135 More specifically, 
he seeks to paint a picture in which members of the aristocracy are entirely 
consumed by corruption while the plebeian party leaders always have the 
best interests of the Roman people at heart.136 It is clear that Sallust has 
a particular political agenda in mind; he often shifts his focus away from 
Jugurtha in favor of the Roman aristocracy.
As we have already noted, Sallust’s historical account of the conflict in 
Numidia is not really about Jugurtha at all. Instead, it is meant to focus on 
Roman leaders like Metellus, Marius and Sulla, who are more important in the 
historical framework of the capital. With these characters as representatives 
of opposing parties, Sallust plays with the notion of political cooperation 
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and expresses his belief that cooperation leads to greatness while the lack 
thereof inevitably results in failure and destruction.137 Additionally, Levene 
describes Sallust’s account as a deliberate ‘fragment,’ intended to allude to 
the unavoidable downfall of Marius and Sulla.138 In this way, Jugurtha and 
Metellus, as well as Metellus and Marius, act as foils for one another and as 
literary prototypes for the eventual ruination of the younger Marius and Sulla 
Felix.
     After looking at numerous sources and comparing our methodological 
frameworks and working definitions to Jugurtha, it seems as if we have made 
little to no progress. In one respect, Jugurtha was most certainly a bandit; he 
relied upon his superior knowledge of local topography, the cover of darkness 
and the mobility of his cavalry to wage a partisan war against oftentimes 
suspect Roman commanders. However, in another respect, as a former 
auxiliary and the ruler of a client-kingdom (loyal to Rome since the time 
of his grandfather), he was obviously a rebel by coming into conflict with 
his patron state. And, in yet another respect, judging by the Senate’s formal 
declaration of war and the Triumph held in the capital upon his defeat, he 
was undoubtedly a hostis, posing a legitimate threat to the hegemony of the 
Roman Republic. Considering his questionable legitimacy and usurpation of 
power, Jugurtha even personifies the Ciceronian interpretation of the latro. 
However, amidst all of this uncertainty, one truth remains: Sallust’s Jugurtha 
does conform to our definition of banditry, but only as a piece of literary 
topoi.
1 Brent D. Shaw, “The Bandit,” in The Romans, ed. Andrea Giardina (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993), 311.
2 Thomas Grünewald, Bandits in the Roman Empire: Myth and Reality, trans. 
John Drinkwater (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 1999), 19.
3 Grünewald, Bandits, 8.
4 Ramsay MacMullen, Enemies of the Roman Order (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1966), 255.
5 Grünewald, Bandits, 13.
6 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 303.
7 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 303.
8 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 305.
9 Grünewald, Bandits, 40.
10 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 305.
11 Grünewald, Bandits, 40.
Penn History Review     91 
Roman Banditry
12 Grünewald, Bandits, 41.
13 Grünewald, Bandits, 16.
14 Grünewald, Bandits, 33.
15 Keith Hopwood, ed., Organised Crime in Antiquity (London: Gerald 
Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1999), 179.
16 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 301.
17 Hopwood, Crime, 180.
18 Hopwood, Crime, 180.
19 Hopwood, Crime, 195-196.
20 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 325.
21 Grünewald, Bandits, 138.
22 Grünewald, Bandits, 5.
23 Grünewald, Bandits, 15-16.
24 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 321.
25 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 322.
26 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 302.
27 Eric Hobsbawm, Bandits (England: George Weidenfeld & Nicolson, Ltd., 
1969), 77.
28 Hobsbawm, Bandits, 21.
29 Hobsbawm, Bandits, 22.
30 Hobsbawm, Bandits, 34.
31 Hobsbawm, Bandits, 35.
32 Hobsbawm, Bandits, 36.
33 Hobsbawm, Bandits, 34.
34 Grünewald, Bandits, 3.
35 Hobsbawm, Bandits, 137.
36 Grünewald, Bandits, 88.
37 Grünewald, Bandits, 87.
38 Grünewald, Bandits, 118.
39 Grünewald, Bandits, 119.
40 Grünewald, Bandits, 50.
41 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 329.
42 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 321.
43 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 308.
44 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 329.
45 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 323.
46 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 323.
47 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 324.
92   Brady B. Lonergan
Roman Banditry
48 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 304.
49 Grünewald, Bandits, 39.
50 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 328.
51 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 303.
52 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 324.
53 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 324.
54 Hopwood, Crime, 188-189.
55 Hopwood, Crime, 189.
56 Hopwood, Crime, 196.
57 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 319.
58 Grünewald, Bandits, 22.
59 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 314.
60 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 316.
61 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 315.
62 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 339.
63 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 340.
64 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 339.
65 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 316.
66 Grünewald, Bandits, 72.
67 Grünewald, Bandits, 89.
68 Grünewald, Bandits, 73.
69 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 307.
70 Grünewald, Bandits, 89.
71 Grünewald, Bandits, 86.
72 Grünewald, Bandits, 79.
73 Grünewald, Bandits, 79.
74 Grünewald, Bandits, 5.
75 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 329-330.
76 Grünewald, Bandits, 7.
77 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 332.
78 Grünewald, Bandits, 6.
79 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 334.
80 Grünewald, Bandits, 35.
81 Grünewald, Bandits, 38.
82 Grünewald, Bandits, 55.
83 Grünewald, Bandits, 48.
84 Grünewald, Bandits, 55.
85 Grünewald, Bandits, 136.
Penn History Review     93 
Roman Banditry
86 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 366.
87 Grünewald, Bandits, 111-112.
88 Grünewald, Bandits, 118.
89 Grünewald, Bandits, 121.
90 Grünewald, Bandits, 9.
91 David Braund, Rome and the Friendly King: The Character of the Client 
Kingship (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 181.
92 Hobsbawm, Bandits, 44.
93 Braund, Friendly King, 182.
94 Linda Honey, “The Isaurian Incident,” Violence in Late Antiquity, ed. H.A. 
Drake. Burlington (VT: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2006) 51-54.
95 P.A. Brunt, “Laus Imperii.” in Roman Imperialism: Readings and Sources, 
ed. Craige B. Champion (Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 2004), 168.
96 Braund, Friendly King, 182-183.
97 Braund, Friendly King, 186.
98 Braund, Friendly King, 184.
99 Braund, Friendly King, 185.
100 Sallust, Catiline’s War, The Jugurthine War, Histories, transl. A. J. Woodman, 
(London: Penguin Books, 2007), 54.
101 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 57.
102 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 56.
103 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 58.
104 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 59.
105 Walter Allen, “The Source of Jugurtha’s Influence in the Roman Senate,” 
Classical Philology 33 (Jan. 1938): 90-92.
106 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 59.
107 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 111.
108 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 55.
109 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 54.
110 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 55.
111 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 136-137.
112 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 54.
113 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 54.
114 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 55.
115 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 138.
116 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 89.
117 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 68.
118 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 67.
94   Brady B. Lonergan
Roman Banditry
119 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 81.
120 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 67.
121 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 89-90.
122 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 90.
123 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 127.
124 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 97.
125 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 138.
126 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 53.
127 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 55.
128 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 82.
129 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 68.
130 Jo-Marie Claassen, “Sallust’s Jugutha: Rebel or Freedom Fighter? On 
Crossing Crocodile-Infested Waters,” The Classical World 86 (1993): 287.
131 Claassen, “Jugurtha,” 276.
132 Casey Dué, “History and Barbarian Speech in Sallust’s ‘Jugurtha’,” Harvard 
Studies in Classical Philology 100 (2000): 325.
133 Claassen, “Jugurtha,” 277.
134 Kurt von Fritz, “Sallust and the Attitude of the Roman Nobility at the Time 
of the Wars against Jugurtha (112-105 B.C.),” Transactions and Proceedings 
of the American Philological Society 74 (1943): 140.
135 Claassen, “Jugurtha,” 285.
136 Von Fritz, “Sallust,” 168.
137 Thomas Wiedemann, “Sallust’s ‘Jugurtha’: Concord, Discord, and the 
Digressions,” Greece & Rome 40 (Apr. 1993): 56.
138 D. S. Levene, “Sallust’s Jugurtha: An Historical 
Fragment,” The Journal of Roman Studies 82 (1992): 64.  
